| The macroworld |
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| The real problem | |
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Page 2 of 2 To enable a macroscopic object to indicate an unpredictable value — to function as the proverbial "pointer" — one exception has to be made: its position may change unpredictably if and when it serves to indicate such a value. Instead of being evidence of the fuzziness of the value-indicating position, such an unpredictable change is evidence of the (counterfactual) fuzziness of the observable measured — the fuzziness that would have obtained if no measurement had been made.
Modes I (detail) by Eric J. Heller.
Macroscopic objects therefore follow trajectories that are only counterfactually fuzzy. Their positions — macroscopic positions, for short — are fuzzy only in relation to an imaginary background that is more differentiated spacewise than the actual world. The region over which such a position is "smeared out" is never probed; it remains undifferentiated. In other words, macroscopic positions are not manifestly fuzzy: their fuzziness does not evince itself in the actual world. Relating as it does to a purely imaginary background, it is itself purely imaginary. The contentious question of whether macroscopic objects obey the classical or the quantum laws is therefore ill-posed: macroscopic objects obey both the classical and the quantum laws, inasmuch as the quantum laws degenerate into the classical laws whenever the fuzziness of observables can be ignored. Where the positions of macroscopic objects are concerned, this is always. |
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