| Wave functions versus propagators |
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| Pseudo-problems | |
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At the heart of the quantum formalism is the amplitude (a.k.a. propagator) < xf , tf | xi , ti > . In the case of a single particle, xi and xf are points in "ordinary" 3-space. In general, they are points in the system's configuration space, which has as many dimensions as the system has degrees of freedom. (The absolute square of this amplitude, integrated with respect to xf over a region R of the configuration space, gives the conditional probability of finding the system in R if the appropriate measurement is made at the time tf, the condition being that the particle was last "seen" at xi at the time ti.) It is customary to introduce the so-called "wave function" Ψ(x,t) by requiring that it satisfy the equation Ψ(xf,tf) = ∫ dxi < xf , tf | xi , ti > Ψ(xi,ti) . Wave functions and propagators provide the same information. Knowing either one can calculate the other. Yet some proposed quantum ontologies (most notably, Everett's "many-worlds interpretation") transmogrify the wave function into a representation of "what ultimately exists" and treat the propagator as nothing more than a computational tool. Whence this partiality? I should have thought that if the propagator is nothing more than a computational tool, then so is the wave function. One obvious reason for the preference of wave functions over propagators is the historical precedence of Schrödinger's "wave mechanics" over Feynman's propagator-based formulation of quantum mechanics.
Another reason for the preference of wave functions over propagators is the primacy of absolute over conditional probabilities in Kolmogorov's mathematical foundation of probability theory.
But the main reason why the wave function is widely regarded as the primary concept is the evolutionary paradigm... |
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