This Quantum World

A ta(b)le of two worlds

Pseudo-problems

The following table highlights some of the differences between the world according to quantum mechanics (QM) and a world that is constructed along the lines laid down by the CCP. You may smile or scoff at the naivety of some or even most of the items in the second column, which aren't even mutually consistent. (For example, the notion that the ultimate constituents of matter are pointlike objects is at odds with the view that forms are bounding surfaces). All the same, at least some of the items in this column are all but universally accepted, for instance the representation of physical space as an intrinsically and completely differentiated "manifold."

The world according to QM	The world according to the CCP
The world's multiplicity (at any one time) rests on spatial relations.	The world's multiplicity (at any one time) rests on delimiting surfaces.
Space is the totality of existing spatial relations.	Space is an intrinsically and completely differentiated, self-existent (i.e., substantial) expanse.
Spatial extension is a quality of spatial relations.	Spatial relations owe their spatial quality to a pre-existent spatial expanse.
The only existing positions are the relative positions between material objects.	Positions exist by themselves, even if they are not possessed ("unoccupied" or "empty").
All existing positions are (more or less) fuzzy.	All existing positions are sharp.
A particle without internal structure is a formless object.	A particle without internal structure is a pointlike object.
The form of a spatially extended object consists of the object's internal spatial relations.	The form of a spatially extended object is a bounding surface.
Considered by themselves, the ultimate constituents of matter are identical in the strong sense of numerical identity.	The ultimate constituents of matter are distinct individual substances.
Two particles can simultaneously possess the same (fuzzy) position.⁽¹⁾	No two objects can simultaneously have the same position.
A particle can be simultaneously in (what we tend to think of as) different places.⁽²⁾	No object can be in two places at the same time.⁽³⁾
The spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. It doesn't go all the way down.	The spatiotemporal differentiation of the world is complete.
Appropriate models of the physical world must be constructed from the top-down.	Models of the physical world can be built from the bottom up, on an intrinsically and completely differentiated spacetime manifold or out of a multitude of individual substances.
Properties and values exist (are possessed) only if, only when, and only to the extent that they are measured.	Properties and values exist regardless of measurements.

Helium illustrates this nicely. In the ground state, the fuzzy positions of its two electrons relative to the nucleus are identical. And in a bottle of superfluid helium, all atoms have the same fuzzy position relative to the bottle.
Examples are the two-slit interference experiment and the fuzzy position of the electron relative to the proton in atomic hydrogen.
Because position is the integrating factor, phenomenal features present in the same place get integrated into the same visual object, while features present in different places get integrated into different objects (or different parts of the same object).

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